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Williams v. Lazar, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 44 (Sep 16, 2021) 
 




This case discusses the requirements for meeting an anti-SLAPP special motion to 
dismiss when it pertains to defamation and opinion-based statements.1 The court reversed the 
district court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions 
that the district court grant the motion. This court concluded that the appellant had met the 
burden of proof under the two-prong anti-SLAPP analysis.  
 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
This is an appeal from the district court after an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss 
was denied. The original case was between Daphne Williams (now the appellant) and Charles 
Lazer (now the respondent). Ms. Williams is an African American woman who purchased a 
condominium. Ms. Williams acted without a real estate agent. Mr. Lazer, a real estate agent, 
represented the seller of the condominium. After on-going problems, Ms. Williams sent a text 
message to Mr. Lazer explaining that she was considering filing a complaint with the Nevada 
Real Estate Division (NRED) due to his behavior which Ms. Williams perceived as racist, sexist, 
and overall unprofessional. After receiving the message, Mr. Lazer contacted the seller of the 
property, NRED, Ms. William’s mortgage lender, an attorney, and an additional real estate agent 
and explained his perception of what happened.  
Once the sale was complete, Mr. Lazer sent Ms. Williams a demand letter seeking an 
apology and several thousand dollars. If she obliged, he would refrain from filing a tort action 
against her because of the text message she sent to him. Ms. Williams refused and then filed an 
NRED complaint alleging that Mr. Lazer displayed unethical, unprofessional, racist and sexist 
behavior during the transaction; inappropriately shared confidential information with her about 
his personal relationship with the seller; contacted the appraiser before the appraisal; and falsely 
claimed that Ms. Williams would not allow the seller’s movers to enter the property which 
caused delays in closing; failed to send her a fully executed copy of the signed purchase 
agreement; and had the seller call Ms. Williams urging her to apologize to Mr. Lazer for her text 
message.  
Lazer then filed a complaint claiming defamation, negligence, business disparagement, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Williams then filed an anti-SLAPP special 
motion to dismiss claiming her statements were protected. 
 
 
1 By Anne-Greyson Long  
Discussion  
 
The issue in this case concerns the scope of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute; particularly 
what the defendant must demonstrate to meet that statute’s good faith standard for protected 
speech, how the statute works with common law-based speech privileges, and what is required of 
the plaintiff in terms of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim. 
 
Williams satisfied her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis  
 
Ms. Williams believes that her statement about Mr. Lazer being raciest, sexist, 
unprofessional, and unethical, is a non-actionable opinion. Ms. Williams argues that her 
remaining statements were either true, factual statements, or Mr. Lazer failed to provide evidence 
that demonstrated Ms. Lazer knew the statements were false-this court agrees. In order to have a 
successful anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss where (1) the defendant shows, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the claim is based on a “good faith communication in furtherance of…the right 
to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern and (2) the plaintiff fails to 
show, with prima facie evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claims.2 In order to satisfy the 
first prong of the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss analysis, the defendant must show that 
(1) the comments at issue fall into one of four categories of protected communications 
enumerated in 41.637 and (2) the communication is made in good faith in that it is trustful and 
made without knowledge of its falsehood.3 Ms. Williams put forth a sworn affidavit in which she 
described the problems she had with respondent-similar cases have found that a sworn affidavit 
is enough to prove good faith.  
Opinions cannot be false. The Court concludes that Ms. Williams has satisfied the first 
prong of the anti-SLAPP framework. Additionally, Rosen explains that courts do not parse words 
but instead consider whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the gist of the story, 
or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the statement is true.4 Further, Mr. Lazer did 
not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims of which he had the burden of showing 
their merit to proceed with the litigation. Absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong 
of the anti-SLAPP analysis because the appellant’s statements were made in good faith and the 
appellant’s communication was related to litigation.  
 
Lazer did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims  
 
Mr. Lazer had the burden of showing that his claims had some merit to proceed with 
litigation under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Abrams. The second prong of the 
anti-SLAPP analysis includes absolute litigation privilege for which Ms. Wallace qualified as a 
result of her complaint filed with the NRED.   
 
 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. §41.660(3). 
3 Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38,40, 458 P.3d 342 (2020) (quoting NRS 41.637). 
4 Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436 P.3d 1220 (2019). 
 
 
The absolute litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis  
 
This court has previously acknowledged and provided clarification that the absolute 
litigation privilege is relevant and is the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Shapiro v. 
Welt. Simply put and of particular relevance to this case, Mr. Lazer cannot demonstrate his 
probability of prevailing in the case if the absolute litigation privilege applies to Ms. Wallace’s 
NRED claim.   Ms. Wallace’s liability would therefore be negated.  The court noted California 




Statements made in a complaint filed with NRED are subject to the absolute litigation privilege  
 
Whether or not the absolute privilege applies is a question of law. Ms. Williams argues 
that the absolute litigation privilege protects her from liability from her NRED complaint 
because her statements were made within the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding. The court 
concluded that an NRED proceeding initiated by a complaint from a party in a real estate 
transaction is quasi-judicial because it meets the criteria outlined in Spencer v. Klementi.5 
Further, the Real Estate Commission, to whom the complaint is lodged, has the authority to 
administer oaths, issue subpoenas, and serve process. Importantly, Mr. Lazer is provided with the 
opportunity to refute evidence presented and witness testimony which is a crucial element in 
establishing absolute litigation privilege. The NRED provides the licensee with the opportunity 
to file an answer to any charges and to ask for a judicial review of an unfavorable ruling or 




Williams filed her NRED complaint in good faith and in anticipation of future litigation  
 
The court concluded that Ms. Williams filed her NRED complaint in good faith and in 
relation to litigation. Ms. Williams complaint is a complaint in a quasi-judicial proceeding and 
the absolute litigation privilege applies and protects her complaint. For absolute privilege to 
apply to statements made in the context of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, (1) a judicial 
proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the 
communication must be related to the litigation.6 Because Mr. Lazer’s claims are derived from 
defamatory statements contained in Ms. William’s complaint, which is protected by absolute 
privilege, the court holds that Mr. Lazer cannot show by prima facie evidence a probability of 




5 Spencer v. Klementi, 136 Nev. 325, 332, 466 P.3d 1241, 1247 (2020) 




 On appeal, this Court concludes that the appellant met the good faith requirement under 
the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellant’s statements were either opinions, truthful statements, or 
were supported by the appellant’s sworn affidavit. The court concludes that the absolute 
litigation privilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and an NRED 
proceeding is quasi-judicial for purposes of privilege. The appellant’s statements met the 
requirements for anti-SLAPP protection and absolute litigation privilege applies. Whether or not 
the privilege applies to particular statements is relevant to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP 
analysis due to the fact that a plaintiff cannot prevail on defamation-based claims and related 
torts if the privilege applies. The respondent cannot prevail on his claims. The Court reversed the 
district court’s decision. 
 
 
 
